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JUVENILE ENEMY COMBATANTS AND THE
JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY IN U.S. MILITARY
COMMISSIONS
Suzanne Farley*
"[Tihe United States now stands alone in a world that has
turned its face against the juvenile death penalty."
- U.S. Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons1
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, the United States military is detaining
juvenile2 terror suspects 3 in military prisons around the
world.4 Some of these juveniles will eventually be tried for
their crimes by a military commission.5 In addition, some of
* Senior Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 47; J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.F.A., Music Engineering, City
University of New York. Dedicated to Harvey Sears.
1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005), abrogating Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
2. The terms "juvenile" or "child" as used in this comment refer to an
individual under the age of eighteen unless stated otherwise. See infra Part
II.D.
3. An individual at Guantanamo Bay prison would be called a "terror
suspect" or a "detainee" until such time as the President labeled such individual
an "enemy combatant" in order to initiate prosecution by military commission.
A person would remain a "terror suspect" or "detainee" during his or her entire
detention if the United States only wished to interrogate him or her. See infra
Part II.A.
4. An investigation found up to 107 juveniles in U.S. military prisons. The
Pentagon has confirmed at least sixty. Neil Mackay, Iraq's Child Prisoners,
SUN. HERALD, Aug. 1, 2004.
5. Military commissions, or tribunals, are courts set up by a country to try
prisoners of war. They have been used throughout time, but were specifically
set up and authorized to try alien unlawful enemy combatants in the War on
Terror at Guantanamo Bay. See LOUIS FISHER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
MILITARY TRIBUNALS: HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND LESSONS 1, 3, 30 (2004),
available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/r132458.pdf (last visited
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these children, who were under the age of sixteen when they
committed their crimes, 6 may be subject to the death penalty.'
According to President Bush's Detention Order of November
13, 2001,' non-citizens9 with ties to al Qaeda 10 may be
sentenced to death for their crimes against humanity.1' This
order does not distinguish between adults and children with
regard to the death penalty. 12
In contrast, the policy for U.S. citizens is much
different.1 3 A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision"4 abrogated
the death penalty for U.S. citizens under the age of
eighteen. 5 This comment addresses this disparity and the
implications that follow.' 6  Specifically, this comment
considers whether alien unlawful 7  "juvenile enemy
May 7, 2007) [hereinafter CRS REPORT]; Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948d(a), 1200 Stat. 2600, 2603 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 948a-950v (2006)), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frdMilitary-Law/pdf/PL-109-366.pdf.
6. E.g., Michael McKenna, War on Terror: The Detainees: The Child
Captives in Irons at Camp Cuba, THE ADVERTISER, Apr. 22, 2003, at 10.
7. The President must first declare the juvenile terror suspect a "juvenile
enemy combatant" to bring the suspect under the jurisdiction of a military
commission. The suspect will then be subject to the death penalty. Military
Commissions Act §§ 948d(a), (c), (d).
8. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Detention
Order].
9. Id. at 57,834 § 2(a).
10. There are various spellings of al Qaeda, such as al Qaida, al-Qaeda or al
Qa'ida.
11. Detention Order, supra note 8, at 57,834 § 4(a).
12. Id. (emphasis added) (the death penalty applies to "[any individual
subject to this order" (emphasis added)).
13. Note that non-citizens are sometimes granted access to U.S. courts, such
as when the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari on an appeal, or the
individual committed his crime in, was detained in, or otherwise had contact
with U.S. sovereign territory. Nevertheless, most non-citizens do not obtain
this access. E.g., Graham-Levin Amendment, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Title X, §
1005, 119 Stat. 2680, 2740-44 (2005) (limiting federal court jurisdiction of cases
filed by prisoners at Guantanamo Bay).
14. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), abrogating Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
15. Id. at 578.
16. See infra Parts IV.A-C.
17. If an enemy combatant is being tried by military commission, then it can
be presumed that he is "unlawful" because military commissions are not
authorized to try lawful "enemy combatants." See Military Commissions Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 948d(a)-(c), 1200 Stat. 2600, 2603 (to be codified at
10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950v (2006)).
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combatants" 8 can be sentenced to the death penalty when
tried by U.S. military commissions.19
Part II begins with a brief background of the United
States' War on Terror that began with the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Part II.A examines legislation passed by
Congress, actions taken by the President and case law that
occurred as a result of these events.2 ° Part II.B examines the
U.S. domestic, U.S. military and the international policies on
the juvenile death penalty.21  Part II.C sets forth the
consequences of being labeled an alien unlawful juvenile
enemy combatant.22 Finally, Part II.D discusses the differing
definitions of the term "juvenile" under U.S. domestic, U.S.
military and international law.23
Part III presents the problem addressed by this comment
-whether alien unlawful juvenile enemy combatants will be
subject to the death penalty when tried by U.S. military
commissions.
Part IV analyzes this problem by examining three
possible safeguards against the death penalty that may be
available to such individuals. Part IV.A examines possible
constitutional protections,24 Part V.B examines protection
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),25 and
Part IV.C examines protection under international human
rights and international humanitarian law.26
Part V sets forth a proposal for resolving this legal
problem by examining various ways the law could be
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See infra Parts IV.A-C.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part II.C. The phrase "unlawful enemy combatant" indicates
that the President has labeled a terror suspect as an individual with
connections to al Qaeda who is suspected of having engaged in acts of terrorism
against the United States. Military Commissions Act § 948a(1). The term
"juvenile enemy combatant" has yet to be used by the United States. However,
it is a natural extension of the phrase "enemy combatant." The term should be
used in future prosecutions of juvenile detainees. See infra Part III. See
generally Amnesty Int'l, Case Studies: Who Are the Guantanamo Detainees?,
http://news.amnesty.org/pages/torture-case8-eng (last visited May 7, 2007)
(providing information about Omar Khadr, a Canadian national).
23. See infra Part II.D.
24. See infra Part IV.A.
25. Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (2006);
see also infra Part IV.B.
26. See infra Part IV.C.
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amended or interpreted in order to proscribe the juvenile
death penalty in U.S. military commissions.
Finally, Part VI concludes that while alien unlawful
juvenile enemy combatants will most likely not have
constitutional or military law protection against the juvenile
death penalty in U.S. military commissions, they may have
protection under international law.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE U.S. WAR ON TERROR
A. Legislation, Presidential Actions and Case Law Following
September 11, 2001
The events of September 11, 2001 and the resulting
deaths of 2,819 individuals 28 are forever etched into the minds
of Americans. What is less documented and well-known are
the consequences of those terrorist attacks with regard to
case law and legislation, and the derogation of rights that has
occurred as a result.29
On September 14, 2001, President Bush declared a state
of emergency: "A national emergency exists by reason of the
terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New
York, and the Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate
threat of further attacks on the United States."3 ° On the
same date, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF),31 a joint resolution which authorized
the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, ... in
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States."32
After receiving this authorization from Congress,
27. See infra Part V.
28. 9/11 by the Numbers, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 5, 2002, available at
httpJ/nymag.com/news/articles/wtc/lyear/numbers.htm.
29. See infra Part II.A.
30. Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist
Attacks, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001); see also Blocking Property and
Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or
Support Terrorism, 66 Fed Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
31. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (50 U.S.C. § 1541 note).
32. Id. § 2(a).
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President Bush issued a military order concerning the
detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens in the
war against terrorism on November 13, 2001 (Detention
Order).3  This Detention Order had two significant
consequences. First, it apparently accorded the President 34
with broad discretion to identify "member[s] of the
organization known as al Qaida" who engaged in "acts of
international terrorism,"35 and to subject them to military
commissions .3  The Detention Order was also the first step in
labeling such individuals as alien unlawful 37  "enemy
combatants,"38 which may have placed them outside the scope
of constitutional law and the majority of international legal
protections.39 Second, the Detention Order,4" combined with
the UCMJ, the AUMF and the DTA,41 "acknowledge[d] a
general Presidential authority to convene military
commissions in circumstances where justified under the
Constitution and laws, including the law of war."42  As a
result, unlawful enemy combatants and juvenile enemy
combatants may be tried by military commissions, where they
have significantly fewer rights than in U.S. domestic courts.43
33. Detention Order, supra note 8.
34. Id. §§ 2(a)(1)(i)-(iii).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 1(e).
37. Individuals are only classified as "lawful" combatants if they: (1) are
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (2) have a fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (3) carry arms openly; and (4)
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
38. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 set forth the procedures for
Combatant Status Review Tribunals, which allowed this group of individuals to
be labeled as "enemy combatants," and therefore, subject to military
commissions. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 [DTA], Pub. L. No. 109-148, Title
X, § 1005(a), 119 Stat. 2739, 2740-41 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note
(2005)), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr359&dbname=109&.
39. See infra Parts II.C, IV.C.
40. "[Ilt is necessary for individuals subject to this order .. to be detained,
and, when tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable
laws by military tribunals." Detention Order, supra note 8, at 57,833 § 1(e).
41. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (2006). The UCMJ sets forth the law and
procedures to be followed in U.S. military commissions and U.S. courts-martial
proceedings. Id.; see also infra Parts II.B.2, VB.
42. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006).
43. See Michael Ratner, PBS, Military Tribunals or Civil Courts: Violations
of the Laws of War or Criminal Acts?,
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After these actions diminished the rights of unlawful
enemy combatants, the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)44
placed some limits on the abrogation of their rights.45
Importantly, this legislation may have particular significance
for juvenile enemy combatants. The DTA expressly prohibits
the "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
[of detainees],"46 which it defines as the "cruel, unusual, and
inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States."47 This statement, if interpreted in a
manner consistent with the Supreme Court's definition of
"cruel and unusual punishment" under the U.S.
Constitution," may abrogate the juvenile death penalty in
U.S. military commissions.49
Shortly following the passage of the DTA, the United
States Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,50 issued two
significant findings with respect to the justification for
military commissions and the rules and procedures to be
followed in them. First, the Hamdan Court decided that
military commissions may be justified, under appropriate
circumstances, to try individuals subject to the President's
Detention Order.51 The lower court in Hamdan previously
found that individuals falling under the President's Detention
Order were automatically subject to trial by military
commissions.52 Hamdan, conversely, clarified that the U.S.
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/justice/world issues_mil.html (last visited May 7,
2007).
44. DTA, Title X, 119 Stat. 2739.
45. Id. §§ 1003(a) (prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment), 1005(1)(a)-(e) (setting forth detailed rules and procedures for
determining the status of detainees outside of United States, and requiring
annual reports to Congress regarding the number of detainees reviewed and the
procedures used at each location, and allowing for judicial review of the
detention of enemy combatants).
46. Id. § 1003(a).
47. Id. § 1003(d).
48. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (finding that the death
penalty for individuals under the age of eighteen constituted cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment).
49. See infra Part V.A.
50. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
51. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775-98.
52. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 35-39 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126
S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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government 53 had the initial burden of showing that the
military commission was justified.54  Second, Hamdan
clarified the law and procedures necessary for a lawful
military commission.5  The Supreme Court stated that
military commissions must comply with "the American
common law of war,"56 the UCMJ, 57 and, at the least,
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. 8 Importantly,
these legal doctrines do not prohibit the juvenile death
penalty, unlike international law sources,5 9 and, arguably, the
DTA.
The final piece of relevant legislation came as a result of
the Supreme Court's finding in Hamdan that the President
did not have authorization from Congress to try individuals
by military commissions.6 0  In order to resolve this issue,61
Congress, on October 17, 2006, less than four months after
Hamdan, passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(Military Commissions Act)62 giving the President specific
authorization to try individuals by military commissions. 3
Importantly, the Military Commissions Act has further
significance. This legislation added to Hamdan's holding
regarding the rules and procedures of military commissions'
in two important areas: the applicability of the Geneva
Convention,' and the UCMJ,65 to alien unlawful enemy
combatants. In both instances, the Military Commission Act
53. The prosecutor in military commissions is the U.S. government. The
U.S. government must justify the need for the military commission before it can
proceed to prosecute an enemy combatant. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775-98.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 2786.
56. Id.
57. Id.; infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the UCMJ).
58. Geneva Convention, supra note 37, at arts. 3(l)(a)-(c); Hamdan, 126 S.
Ct. at 2786; infra Part II.B.3.
59. See infra Parts II.B.3, IV.C.
60. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774-75.
61. Between the decision in Hamdan and the passage of the Military
Commissions Act, prisoners at Guantanamo Bay had no means of trial.
Hamdan was decided on June 29, 2006, and the Military Commissions Act of
2006 was set forth on October 17, 2006. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749.
62. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 1200 Stat. 2600
(2006), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/pdf/PL-109-366.pdf.
63. Press Release, White House, President Bush Signs Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (Oct. 17, 2006), at
httpJ/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061017-1.html.
64. Military Commissions Act § 948b(g).
65. Id. §§ 948b(d)(A)-(C), 950(b)-(g).
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resulted in the further abrogation of the rights of juvenile
enemy combatants.
First, the Military Commissions Act stated that while
Common Article 3 protected alien unlawful enemy
combatants,66  the remaining articles of the Geneva
Convention were not applicable to such individuals.67 By
comparison, the Supreme Court in Hamdan found that at the
least Mr. Hamdan 68 was entitled to Common Article 3
protection, 69 but did not decide whether his rights extended
beyond this section of the Geneva Convention.7" The Military
Commissions Act, therefore, decided this issue for the
Judiciary and chose to limit alien unlawful enemy
combatants' protection under international law.
Second, the Military Commissions Act limited the
application of several sections of the UCMJ, 71 the doctrine
which set forth the rules and procedures to be followed in
U.S. military commissions.72 While Hamdan clearly stated
that the rules in the UCMJ "must apply to military
commissions unless impracticable,"73 the Court did not define
"impracticable." On the contrary, Congress, by passing the
Military Commissions Act, defined which rights were
"impracticable" by expressly stating which sections of the
UCMJ did not apply in U.S. military commissions.74 In doing
66. Id. § 948b(f); see also infra Part II.B.3 (setting forth the protection
offered by Common Article 3).
67. Id. § 948b(g) (emphasis added). Further, note the signing agreement to
the Military Commissions Act, which states that the President "has the
authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and application of the
Geneva Conventions." Id. § 6(a)(3)(A); see also Remarks on Signing the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1831 (Oct. 17, 2006).
Therefore, despite promulgations by the U.S. Judiciary, the Military
Commissions Act leaves the final interpretation of the Geneva Convention to
the President.
68. Salim Ahmed Hamdan was captured in Afghanistan in 2001 and
detained at Guantanamo Bay. Hamdan was believed to be Osama bin Laden's
personal bodyguard, and was suspected of many crimes in the War on Terror,
including murder. The President determined that Hamdan was an alien
unlawful enemy combatant, and in 2003, he was designated for trial by military
commission. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd,
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
69. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795 (emphasis added); see also infra Part II.B.3.
70. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795.
71. Military Commissions Act §§ 948b(d)(A)-(C), 950(b)-(g),
72. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790-91.
73. Id. at 2791.
74. Military Commissions Act §§ 948b(d)(A)-(C), 950(b)-(g).
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so, Congress also limited the rights of alien unlawful enemy
combatants under military law.
As a result of this legislation, military commissions
became a lawful means of trying enemy combatants. What
remains unclear is the policy of the U.S. military regarding
the use of the juvenile death penalty in military commissions.
B. U.S. Domestic, U.S. Military, and International Policy on
the Juvenile Death Penalty
In order to determine whether the juvenile death penalty
is a lawful means of punishment in U.S. military
commissions, the U.S. domestic, military and international
policies regarding this matter must be examined.
75
1. U.S. Domestic Policy on the Juvenile Death Penalty
for U.S. Citizens
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment."76 On March 1,
2005, the Supreme Court, in Roper v. Simmons,77 found that
imposing the death penalty on offenders who committed their
crimes while under the age of eighteen, constituted "cruel and
unusual punishment" as envisioned by the framers of the
Constitution.7"
Roper involved a minor respondent, Christopher
Simmons. At the age of seventeen, Simmons decided that "he
wanted to murder someone," and planned a murder with two
friends.7 9 After breaking into the home of the victim, Shirley
Crook, Simmons and his friends bound her hands and feet
with electrical wire, wrapped her entire face in duct tape, and
pushed her from a bridge, drowning her in the waters below.8 0
Despite the callousness of this crime, the Supreme Court
categorically held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution of any offender under the age of eighteen, for any
75. This comment will not resolve the issue, but may offer insight into the
likelihood of the U.S. government approving the use of the juvenile death
penalty in U.S. military commissions.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
77. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), abrogating Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
78. Id. at 578.
79. Id. at 556.
80. Id.
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crime.81 This finding was supported by three rationales: (1)
the maturity and irresponsibility of juveniles as compared to
adults; (2) juveniles' vulnerability and susceptibility to
negative influences in their environments; and (3) the
unformed character and personality of juveniles as compared
to adults.8 2 As a result of Roper, it is now unconstitutional to
sentence any juvenile to the death penalty in U.S. courts. 3
a. U.S. Domestic Policy on Constitutional Rights for
Non-Citizens
U.S. domestic courts have also addressed the
constitutional rights of non-citizens tried outside of U.S.
sovereign territory. In order to determine if alien unlawful
juvenile enemy combatants have constitutional rights when
tried in U.S. military commissions, the cases of Boumediene v.
Bush,84 Johnson v. Eisentrager"5 and Dorr v. United States 6
must be examined. Although these cases considered the
applicability of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to non-
citizens, they offer the only guide available to the possibility
of non-citizens' rights under the Eighth Amendment.
Boumediene, Eisentrager, and Dorr are split on whether
non-citizens are afforded the protection of the particular
constitutional right at issue in each case. Boumediene found
that non-citizens tried outside of U.S. sovereign territory do
not have any constitutional rights,87 whereas Eisentrager and
81. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
82. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), abrogating Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007). This case was a
consolidation of two cases, In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d
443 (D.D.C. 2005), and Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
None of the seven detainees involved were U.S. citizens or had any connections
with the United States. See Khalid, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 316.
85. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (concerning twenty-one
German nationals, or enemy aliens, who were arrested in China and detained in
Germany after World War II, principally for collecting and furnishing American
intelligence to Japanese forces; they petitioned for writs of habeas corpus and
lost).
86. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (involving an appeal from the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands concerning the right to a jury trial;
finding that a jury trial was not a constitutional necessity in a criminal case in
the Philippine Islands, where there was already an established system of
justice).
87. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
[Vol: 47838
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Dorr found that such individuals are not protected by the
Fifth or Sixth Amendments, while leaving open the question
of other constitutional rights.8"
In reaching their conclusions, each court had a different
rationale for its denial of the constitutional right in question.
The Boumediene court concentrated merely on the location of
the petitioners outside of U.S. sovereign territory. 9  In
contrast, the Eisentrager Court focused on the loss of Fifth
Amendment protection endured by U.S. military personnel
when tried by courts-martial,9 ° and the injustice of extending
such protection to non-citizens while denying such a right to
citizens. 9' The Court in Dorr instead concentrated on how the
U.S. constitutional right would affect and fit into the country
and court system in question.92 These different rationales
may offer some insight into whether alien unlawful "enemy
combatants" will be offered the Eighth Amendment protection
against the juvenile death penalty in U.S. military
commissions.
2. U.S. Military Policy on the Juvenile Death Penalty
The UCMJ contains the basic rules and procedures to be
followed in U.S. courts-martial 93  and in U.S. military
commissions.94 United States military personnel and lawful
enemy combatants" are tried by U.S. courts-martial. 6 The
entire UCMJ applies in these proceedings.97 In contrast,
88. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784; Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148.
89. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 991.
90. See infra notes 91, 93 (providing information on courts-martial and their
law).
91. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 783-84. Courts-martial are governed by the
UCMJ, which does not require the granting of constitutional rights, to persons
subject to its jurisdiction. See Note, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Before
Courts-Martial, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 127, 127 (1964).
92. See Dorr, 195 U.S. at 144-45.
93. See UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (2006); see also id. § 816, art. 16. A
courts-martial is a court where the U.S. military try individuals, either U.S.
citizens or non-citizens, including "prisoners of war in custody of the armed
forces," or "persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field,"
who commit crimes of war. Id. § 802, arts. 2(a)(1)-(12).
94. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2786 (2006).
95. A "lawful combatant" fits the definition set forth in the Geneva
Convention. See supra note 37.
96. UCMJ § 802, arts. 2(a)(1)-(12); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-366, § 948d(b), 1200 Stat. 2600 (2006).
97. Military Commissions Act § 948d(b).
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alien unlawful enemy combatants are subject to trial by
military commissions." Military commissions are governed
by both the UCMJ 99 and the Military Commissions Act. 100
Therefore, determining the law that will apply in U.S.
military commissions concerning the juvenile death penalty
requires an examination of death penalty laws under the
UCMJ and under the Military Commissions Act.
The UCMJ is ambiguous with regard to the juvenile
death penalty." 1 It states that "any person" subject to its
provisions "shall suffer death" for unlawfully killing another
human being with a premeditated design to kill, or for
burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery or aggravated arson
resulting in death.102 The word "juvenile," nor any synonym
for it, is never used within the UCMJ. Therefore, "any
person" most likely includes both juveniles and adults.
However, the UCMJ also prohibits "cruel and unusual
punishment,"10 3 which under U.S. domestic law would
prohibit the juvenile death penalty for individuals under the
age of eighteen.1 0
4
In contrast, the Military Commissions Act authorizes the
death penalty'01 for a longer list of offenses °6 which result in
the death of a protected person. 0 7 The Military Commissions
Act similarly does not distinguish between adults and
children, but does use the phrase "any person" in reference to
the death penalty.'0 Yet, the Military Commissions Act also
includes a proclamation against cruel and unusual
98. Id. § 948c. Military commissions are not authorized to try lawful enemy
combatants. Id. § 948d(b).
99. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786.
100. See Military Commissions Act §§ 948b(a)-(c), 948c.
101. See infra Part IV.B.
102. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (2006); see also id. § 918, art. 118.
103. Id. § 855, art. 55.
104. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); see also infra Part IV.A.
105. Military Commissions Act § 948d(d).
106. Id. §§ 950v(b)(1)-(28). Comparatively, the UCMJ lists the offenses
punishable by murder as premeditated murder, or the "perpetration or
attempted perpetration of burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated arson"
resulting in death. UCMJ § 918, art. 118.
107. "Protected persons" include civilians not taking an active part in
hostilities, military personnel who are set aside from fighting by sickness,
wounds or detention, and military medical or religious personnel. Military
Commissions Act §§ 950v(a)(2)(A)-(C).
108. Id. § 950v(b)(15).
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punishment °9 that may curtail the use of the death penalty
for individuals under eighteen according to U.S. domestic
law.110
3. International Policy on the Juvenile Death Penalty
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties"' sets
forth the general rules a state must follow in its treaty
obligations. While many international human rights and
international humanitarian treaties concern the rights of
juveniles,"2 for the purpose of a defense against the juvenile
death penalty, this comment will focus on: (1) the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(Geneva Convention);" 3 (2) the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC);114  (3) its Optional Protocol on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Optional Protocol
to the CRC);" and (4) the International Covenant on Civil
109. Id. § 949s.
110. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); see also infra Part IV.A.
111. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27
(May 23, 1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force on Jan. 27,
1980), available at
httpJ/untreaty.un.orgilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/l 1_1969.pdf
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
112. The rights of juveniles are protected in other treaties, but these are the
most significant and widely-ratified for the purpose of a discussion about the
juvenile death penalty. See Melissa A. Jamison, Detention of Juvenile Enemy
Combatants at Guantanamo Bay: The Special Concerns of the Children, 9 U.C.
DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POLY 127, 145-53 (2005).
113. Geneva Convention, supra note 37. The United States ratified this
treaty on February 8, 1955. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1948,
httpJ/www.icrc.orgihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited May
7, 2007) (providing a ratification table, listed by state party). This treaty
expressly applies to "all cases of declared war" and sets forth the definitions of
combatants and various types of war in order to determine the extent of
international legal protection. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War
Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in
the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 704 (2004).
114. Convention on the Rights of the Child [CRC], Feb. 16, 1995, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3. The United States is a signatory to the CRC, but has not yet
ratified it. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 20 November 1989,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=540&ps=S (last visited May
7, 2007) (providing a signatory table with information on Somalia and the
United States). This convention is meant to protect all children and to
recognize their unique rights and protections. CRC, supra, at pmbl.
115. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 263, U.N. GAOR, 54th
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and Political Rights (ICCPR). 116
Both the CRC and the ICCPR contain express
proclamations that recognize the greater protections and
rights of juveniles. 17 The CRC recognizes that children
deserve special safeguards, care and legal protection, 118 and
that "every child has the inherent right to life." 9 The ICCPR
explicitly extends this protection to the context of the juvenile
death penalty, stating that the "[sientence of death shall not
be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen
years of age." 2 °
The Geneva Convention instead prohibits "cruel and
unusual punishment." 2' Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention, on the other hand, which is the only section of
the Geneva Convention available in military commissions,'22
offers less protection. Common Article 3 "prohibits cruel
treatment and torture," but does not address specific
punishments. 123
Finally, the CRC, 24 the Optional Protocol to the CRC, 25
Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (July 5, 2000) [hereinafter
Optional Protocol to the CRC]. The United States ratified this treaty on
December 23, 2003. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed
Conflict, 25 May 2000,
httpJ/www.icrc.orgihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=595&ps=P (last visited May
7, 2007) (providing a ratification table, listed by state party). The Optional
Protocol to the CRC mandated the protection of children involved in armed
conflict. See Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra, at pmbl.
116. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], Oct. 5,
1977, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The United States ratified the ICCRP on September 8,
1992. See Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights
[UNHCHR], Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human
Rights Treaties (June 9, 2004), http'//www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. This
treaty was directed at protecting the basic human rights and freedoms of all
individuals, both civilians and those involved in armed conflict. ICCPR, supra,
pmbl.
117. CRC, supra note 114, at art. 6.1, 37; ICCPR, supra note 116, at art. 6(5).
118. CRC, supra note 114, at pmbl.
119. Id. at art. 6.1. The CRC affords rather vague rights to juveniles, but at
the least shows that juveniles should be distinguished and receive greater
protection under the law. See Jamison, supra note 112, at 148-49.
120. ICCPR, supra note 116, art. 6(5).
121. Geneva Convention, supra note 37.
122. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948b(f), 1200
Stat. 2600 (2006). Individuals cannot assert the protections of the remainder of
the Geneva Convention in military commissions. Id. § 948b(g).
123. Geneva Convention, supra note 37, at art. 3(1)(a).
124. CRC, supra note 114, at art. 1.
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and the ICCPR12 6 make explicit the intention of international
law to define a juvenile as an individual under the age of
eighteen. 127 This is accomplished by setting forth an express
definition of the terms "juvenile" and "child." 2 ' This
language clarifies international law's stance on the definition
of juvenile; a definition that is contrary to that enunciated by
the U.S. military.'29
C. The Title of Alien Unlawful Juvenile Enemy Combatant
and Its Consequences
The War on Terror involves a new kind of fighter and a
new kind of war not envisioned at the time of the
implementation of the Geneva Convention. 130  Modern wars
have resulted in a breakdown of international law
distinctions between international armed conflicts versus
internal conflicts, 131 between state actors versus non-state
actors, 32 between combatants versus civilians, 33 between
spatial zones where the war is occurring versus zones where
it is not occurring, 3 4 and between temporal distinctions of
war and peace. 135 No longer is war fought exclusively on an
open battlefield, with men in fatigues openly carrying guns,
lined up in neat rows across opposing spatial boundaries. 136
The War on Terror instead involves combatants who are
terrorists, who hide their combatant status behind plain
clothes, who strike with bombs and in suicide missions rather
than carrying arms openly, and who may be unaware of their
"commander in chief."137
Because the Geneva Convention's definitions no longer
apply to most modern wars and combatants, 38 almost all
125. Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note 115, at pmbl.
126. ICCPR, supra note 116, at art. 6(5).
127. See infra Part II.D.
128. CRC, supra note 114, at art. 1; ICCPR, supra note 116, at art. 6(5);
Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note 115, at pmbl.
129. See infra Parts IID, IV.C.
130. Brooks, supra note 113, at 710-14.
131. Id. at 711-14.
132. Id. at 707-11, 714.
133. Id. at 729-36.
134. Id. at 720-25.
135. Id. at 725-28.
136. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 113, at 730.
137. See, e.g., id. at 708-10, 731.
138. However, the War on Terror is one of the most prevalent modern-day
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combatants in the War on Terror will be considered
"unlawful."" 9 As a result, they will be denied the majority of
international law protections, 140  at most receiving the
protection of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.14 '
If the U.S. government wishes to prosecute an unlawful
combatant or detainee, they must further classify him as an
"alien unlawful enemy combatant" 42 to subject him or her to
trial by a military commission. 143 With the exception of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention,'" these
individuals then lose the majority of international law
protections, 45 perhaps constitutional protections, 46 and even
wars, and a war that is becoming more common with passing time. See, e.g.,
Brooks, supra note 113, at 705-10.
139. See supra note 37 (discussing the Geneva Convention test for
"unlawful"); see also Press Release, White House, Statement by the Press
Secretary on the Geneva Convention (May 7, 2002), at
httpJ/whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/print/20030507-18.html. The U.S.
government maintains that al Qaeda prisoners captured during the War on
Terror are "detainees," not lawful prisoners of war protected by the majority of
the Geneva Convention. See Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, 'Unlawful
Combatants' or 'Prisoners of War The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 59, 79-82 (2003).
140. See, eg., Brooks, supra note 113, at 694; see also infra Part IV.C.
141. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2794-95 (2006). Common Article
3 protection is granted to all individuals, regardless of lawful or unlawful
status. Yet, this provision grants few rights short of the right to humane
treatment. Geneva Convention, supra note 37, at art 3; supra Part II.B.3.
142. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 948a(1)(i)-(ii),
949d(c), 1200 Stat. 2600 (2006). Individuals can be labeled "unlawful" because
they do not fit the definition in the Geneva Convention, see supra note 37, but
fall short of an "enemy combatant." Almost all detainees at Guantanamo Bay
are "unlawful" because they are members of al Qaeda, but are not yet "unlawful
enemy combatants." This second determination is made by a Combatant Status
Review Tribunal once the U.S. government chooses to prosecute the individual.
Military Commissions Act § 948d(c).
143. Military Commissions Act § 948d(a). It is not clear where an unlawful
combatant who is not also labeled an "enemy combatant" would be tried.
Military commissions do not have authorization to try unlawful combatants or
prisoners of war, only alien unlawful enemy combatants. Military Commissions
Act § 948a(3), § 948d(a). In the War on Terror, the issue has not yet emerged
because the U.S. government, through the Combatant Status Review Tribunal,
labels any unlawful combatant or detainee an "alien unlawful enemy
combatant" at the time they seek prosecution. Military Commissions Act §
948d(c). Generally, the unlawful combatants or detainees are held for
questioning and released. See Eric Lichtblau, Study Finds Sharp Drop in the
Number of Terrorism Cases Prosecuted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006, at A9.
144. Military Commissions Act §§ 948b(f)-(g).
145. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 113, at 694.
146. See infra Part IV.A.
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147some military law protections.
In the War on Terror, "the U.S. has so far insisted that it
recognizes no lawful enemy combatants at all,"48 and in fact,
the President declared that all members of al Qaeda, the
Taliban and associated forces are "unlawful enemy
combatants." 49  As trials by military commissions offer
significantly fewer rights than trials in U.S. courts-martial,
this is a weighty designation. 50
The label of "unlawful enemy combatant" has further
consequences. No longer is war fought only between adults.
Modern wars, especially wars involving Third World
countries, less organized forces, or "wars on terror," often
involve combatants that are children.' 5' The terrorist
organization al Qaeda is one such example. 152 International
law has sought to protect such children, both as combatants
and civilians,'53 but the definitions of war have deteriorated
and led to a derogation of juveniles' rights.5 4
As a result, we are now faced with a new label, "alien
unlawful juvenile enemy combatant,'15 and possibly with a
further derogation of rights. 56 A label arbitrarily defined and
147. The Military Commissions Act expressly states that not all provisions of
the UCMJ apply to enemy combatants tried by military commission. Military
Commissions Act §§ 948b(d)(A)-(C), 950(b)-(g) (eliminating the right to a speedy
trial, the right against self-incrimination, some rights during pre-trial
investigation, and some rights to appeal, rehearing and/or review of decisions).
148. E.g., Brooks, supra note 113, at 735.
149. Detention Order, supra note 8, §§ 1(e), 2(a)(i)-(iii); Military Commissions
Act § 948a(1)(i); Brooks, supra note 113, at 732-33.
150. See Ratner, supra note 43. Military Commissions offer the least amount
of protections and rights. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act §§ 948b(d)(A)-(C)
(listing the UCMJ provisions that do not apply to alien unlawful enemy
combatants tried by military commission); Press Release, Human Rights First,
Military Commission Proceedings Violate International Law (Aug. 17, 2004), at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2004_alerts/0817.htm (presenting the
statement of Avidan Cover, Senior Associate of Human Rights First).
151. See Amnesty Int'l, Child Soldiers: A Global Issue,
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/childsoldiers-background-eng (last visited May 7,
2007); see also Brooks, supra note 113, at 735.
152. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, supra note 22.
153. See CRC, supra note 114; Geneva Convention, supra note 37; ICCPR,
supra note 116; Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note 115.
154. See Brooks, supra note 113, at 677.
155. See generally Jamison, supra note 112 (discussing the detention of
juveniles in U.S. military commissions and the law and protections that are
offered to them).
156. With the passage of the Graham-Levin Amendment, once an individual
is determined to be an enemy combatant by the Combatant Status Review
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applied in taking away adults' vital rights5 7 is now being
attached to a group of individuals traditionally afforded even
greater protection and rights. 58 This label may now be used
to sentence juveniles to the death penalty when tried by U.S.
military commissions.' 59 Importantly, this protection from
the juvenile death penalty is fervently guarded by almost
every state in the world, 6 ° including by U.S. domestic law,'6 '
but it may not be protected by U.S. military law in military
commissions.
162
D. Differences in the Definition of "Juvenile"
Further exacerbating the aforementioned derogation of
rights, the U.S. military defines the terms "juvenile" or "child"
differently than U.S. domestic law or international law. '6
U.S. domestic and international law define the term as any
individual under the age of eighteen.1" United States
military law, as applied in military commissions, instead
Tribunal, his or her fate will almost certainly be decided by military
commission. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Landmark Torture Ban
Undercut, Dec. 16, 2005,
http'//hrw.orgenglish/docs/2005/12/16/usdoml2311.htm; see also Graham-Levin
Amendment, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Title X, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2680, 2740-44
(2005).
157. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 474-77
(D.D.C. 2005). Some believe the United States impermissibly applies this
classification to al Qaeda detainees as a group. See Mofidi & Eckert, supra note
139, at 87-88. In addition, the United States does not appear to maintain the
presumption of prisoner of war status, as required by the Geneva Convention,
until this status is determined otherwise by a competent tribunal. Geneva
Convention, supra note 37, at art. 5.
158. E.g., Jamison, supra note 112, at 153-55.
159. See infra Parts IV.A-C.
160. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576-77 (2005).
161. See id. at 578 (ending the juvenile death penalty for individuals under
the age of 18); infra Part IV.A.
162. See infra Part IV.B.
163. Amnesty Int'l, The Threat of a Bad Example-Undermining
International Standards as "War on Terror" Detentions Continue,
http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAMR511142003 (last visited May 7,
2007).
164. CRC, supra note 114, at art. 1 (stating that a "child" is "every human
being under the age of 18 years"); ICCPR, supra note 116, art. 6(5) (stating that
a sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age); Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note 115, pmbl.
(stating that a child means every human being below the age of 18); Roper, 543
U.S. at 574. The phrases "child," "juvenile," or even "persons below eighteen,"
are used interchangeably, but appear to mean the same thing.
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defines a "juvenile" or "child" as a non-citizen held outside
U.S. sovereign territory who is under the age of sixteen. 165
This difference has a potentially grave impact on children
ages sixteen and seventeen. It also demonstrates the ability
and intention of the U.S. military to interpret laws differently
than U.S. courts, and the implications this may have for alien
unlawful juvenile enemy combatants.
III. THE LEGAL PROBLEM: UNLAWFUL JUVENILE ENEMY
COMBATANTS AND THE DEATH PENALTY
President Bush's Detention Order authorizes him to
detain anyone "who is not a United States citizen"166 whom he
has "reason to believe . . . is or was a member of the
organization known as al Qaida"' 67 and who "has engaged in.
. or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism ...
that have caused . . . injury to or adversary effects on the
United States."16 Any such individual may then be labeled
an "alien unlawful enemy combatant," '69 tried by a military
commission and "punished in accordance with the penalties
provided under applicable law, including life imprisonment or
death.' 7 0 This authorization of the death penalty for "enemy
combatants" does not discriminate between adults and
children. 171
On November 7, 2005, the first alien unlawful juvenile
enemy combatant, Omar Ahmed Khadr, was docketed for
trial by a military commission. 172 Khadr is a Canadian citizen
who, at the age of fifteen, allegedly killed a U.S. soldier
during a battle near Khost, Afghanistan. 17' Because Khadr is
not a U.S. citizen, is classified as an "al-Qa'ida fighter,"174 and
165. E.g., Jamison, supra note 112, at 135-36.
166. Detention Order, supra note 8, § 2(a).
167. Id. § 2(a)(1)(i).
168. Id. § 2(a)(1)(ii).
169. See supra Part II.C; see also supra note 156 (discussing the Combatant
Status Review Tribunal).
170. Detention Order, supra note 8, § 4(a).
171. Id. (stating that the death penalty would apply broadly to "[a]ny
individual subject to this order").
172. U.S. Dep't of Defense, Khadr: Commission Transcripts, Exhibits, and
Allied Papers,
httpJ/www.defenselink.mil/news/commissionsexhibitskhadr.html (last visited
May 7, 2007); see also Amnesty Int'l, supra note 22.
173. E.g., Amnesty Int'l, supra note 22.
174. E.g., id.
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allegedly engaged in terrorism aimed at harming the United
States, he falls under President Bush's Detention Order175
and therefore is subject to trial by a military commission. As
a result, he may also be subject to the death penalty, despite
his young age.176 Despite this authorization, pursuant to a
request from Canada, the U.S. Department of Defense agreed
to forego the death penalty in his case.177 It is significant,
however, that Canada felt the need to insist on this pardon,
as it appeared that this plea was necessary to avoid the
pursuit of the juvenile death penalty. Also significant is that
this juvenile enemy combatant was a citizen of Canada, a
country to which the United States is known to have close
ties. 178 It is questionable whether the result would have been
different if Khadr had been from a country with which the
United States is not closely allied.
Importantly, an investigation in 2004 reported that there
are up to 107 other juveniles from countries around the
world 79 currently detained in U.S. military prisons.18 0  The
Pentagon has confirmed at least 60 such individuals.8 1  At
the present time, it remains unclear whether these juvenile
terror suspects will be prosecuted, and if the death penalty
will be pursued in their cases. 8 2 While some legislation could
be interpreted to prohibit the juvenile death penalty for such
individuals,8 3 it is unclear how the United States will choose
175. Detention Order, supra note 8, § 2(a)(1).
176. The Detention Order does not differentiate between children and adults.
Id. § 4(a).
177. E.g., Amnesty Int'l, supra note 22.
178. Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks at 9/11 Commemoration
Ceremony with Citizens of Halifax (Sept. 11, 2006), available at
http://canada.usembassy.gov/contenttextonly.asp?section=can-usa&subsectionl
=security&document=rice visit_091106citizens. Because of close relations
between the two countries, it is possible that the United States felt political
pressure to forego the death penalty for sake of future relations. If the juvenile
had not been a Canadian national, the result might have been different. See
generally Amnesty Int'l, supra note 22.
179. They are from countries such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, and
Morocco. See Cageprisoners.com, The Kids of Guantanamo Bay,
http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=7880 (last visited May 7, 2007).
180. Mackay, supra note 4.
181. Id. This discrepancy could have something to do with the definition of
"juvenile." See supra Part II.D.
182. Id. Many of the terror suspects may never be prosecuted, but will be
held until the end of the War on Terror with al Qaeda. See Lichtblau, supra
note 144.
183. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat.
848 [Vol: 47
JUVENILE ENEMY COMBATANTS
to interpret the various legislation and case law that has been
generated by the War on Terror. Therefore, the question
remains whether the United States will subject future alien
unlawful juvenile enemy combatants to the death penalty
when they are tried by U.S. military commissions.
IV. ANALYSIS: THREE SOURCES OF POSSIBLE PROTECTION
AGAINST THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
Having established that U.S. military commissions are
valid forms of trial for alien unlawful juvenile enemy
combatants, there are three possible sources of law which
may be available to protect such individuals from the death
penalty.' 84 This protection could come in the form of U.S.
constitutional protection, military law protection, or
protection under international human rights or humanitarian
law. Each of these sources should be examined thoroughly to
determine their availability and the strength of their
protection against the juvenile death penalty.
A. Constitutional Law Protection Against the Juvenile Death
Penalty: The Eighth Amendment
1. U.S. Domestic Courts and the Eighth Amendment:
Roper v. Simmons and the Court's Rationale
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments."' Roper v.
Simmons..6 held that imposing the death penalty on any
offender who committed a crime when under the age of
eighteen constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" under
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 8 7 Roper,
importantly, is a categorical rule"88 that is not restricted to
the facts of that case, but instead, unconditionally forbids the
2739, 2740-41 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note (2005)); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 577-78 (2005).
184. See infra Parts IV.A-C.
185. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
186. Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
187. Id. at 578, abrogating Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
Previously, an individual who committed a capital offense at age sixteen or
above could receive the death penalty. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
380 (1989).
188. Roper, 543 U.S. at 587 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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execution of any offender under eighteen, for any crime, no
matter how deliberate, wanton, or cruel.18 9
The rationale for the Roper decision was that juveniles
have a greater "vulnerability and comparative lack of control
over their immediate surroundings" 190 and "struggle to define
their identity,"' 9' and therefore, "have a greater claim than
adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences
in their whole environment."'92 In addition, the Court noted
that "[fMrom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to
equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a
greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies
will be reformed."
1 93
The categorical rule of Roper clearly states that all
.juveniles under the age of eighteen may not be subjected to
the death penalty.' This is despite the fact that "some
under [eighteen] have already attained a level of maturity
some adults will never reach."' 95 Nevertheless, the Court felt
that because some under eighteen did not have sufficient
culpability and maturity, it was important to draw a line at
eighteen. 9 6  Importantly, this opinion did not differentiate
between citizens and non-citizens. If juveniles that are U.S.
citizens have a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility,"'97 and therefore, "a greater claim
than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative
influences in their environment,"9 ' then so should non-citizen
juveniles, including alien unlawful juvenile enemy
combatants. In addition, the Roper Court noted that it would
be morally misguided to "equate the failings of a minor with
those of an adult."' 99 This moral duty may also extend to non-
citizen juveniles tried by U.S. military commissions.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 570 (majority opinion).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 553.
193. Id. at 570.
194. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 569.
198. Id. at 553.
199. Id. at 570.
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2. U.S. Military Commissions and the Possibility of
Eighth Amendment Protection
The Supreme Court has yet to consider whether non-
citizens held outside of U.S. sovereign territory have the
Eighth Amendment constitutional right against "cruel and
unusual punishment" in the form of the juvenile death
penalty. Courts who have considered the application of other
amendments to the U.S. Constitution to non-citizens have
found either that such individuals do not have any
constitutional rights, or that they may have certain
constitutional rights, but not all of them. Importantly, each
of these courts relied on a different rationale in reaching their
decisions.200 These different rationales may offer insight into
whether the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and
unusual punishment will be offered in U.S. military
commissions.
First, non-citizens held outside U.S. sovereign territory
may not have any constitutional rights when tried outside
U.S. sovereign territory. This view was espoused in
Boumediene,20 1 where the court stated that "[p]recedent in
this court and the Supreme Court holds that the Constitution
does not confer rights on aliens without property or presence
within the United States."20 2
The rationale in Boumediene was resolute; the
petitioners were outside of U.S. sovereign territory, and
therefore, did not have constitutional rights.20 3 Under this
unconditional rationale, alien unlawful juvenile enemy
combatants would not have the protection of the Constitution
because U.S. military commissions are held outside of U.S.
sovereign territory.20 4
Second, non-citizens held outside U.S. sovereign territory
may not have all constitutional rights, but may have certain
limited ones. This interpretation can be found in
200. See infra Part IV.A.2.
201. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007). See supra note 84
for the facts of the case.
202. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 991.
203. See id. at 990 n.8 ("[T]he dispositive fact was not a petitioner's enemy
alien status, but his lack of presence within any sovereign territory.").
204. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471 (2004).
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Eisentrager2° and in Dorr.206 The Court in Eisentrager stated
that it is "well established that certain constitutional
protections available to persons inside the United States are
unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders."20 7
The rationale of the Eisentrager208 Court was that it was
inconsistent to offer the Fifth Amendment due process right
to non-citizens tried outside of U.S. sovereign territory, when
this right is denied to U.S. citizens who entered military
service. 20 9 After entry into military service, U.S. citizens are
subject to trial by courts-martial, where the rules and
procedures to be followed are set forth in the UCMJ, which is
not obligated to recognize constitutional rights.210 In 1950,
the Eisentrager Court felt that at the least U.S. military
personnel would be "stripped of their Fifth Amendment
rights" in courts-martial. 21  However, based on more recent
decisions by the U.S. Court of Military Appeals,212 the trend is
moving towards granting U.S. military personnel all or
almost all of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights.213
Accordingly, at the least, U.S. military personnel may be
granted the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and
unusual punishment in the form of the juvenile death
penalty.214 Therefore, according to Eisentrager's rationale and
more recent decisions by the U.S Court of Military Appeals,
the Eighth Amendment may be available to protect non-
citizens tried in military commissions.
The Dorr215 Court relied on a different rationale in
denying constitutional protection to parties outside of U.S.
205. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783-84 (1950). See supra note 85
for the facts of the case.
206. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148 (1904) (emphasis added). See
supra note 86 for the facts of the case.
207. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 991 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
693 (2001)) (emphasis added).
208. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763.
209. See id. at 783-84.
210. Note that a citizen tried by courts-martial will still have greater rights
than a non-citizen tried by military commission, and most likely will have at
least some constitutional rights. See CRS REPORT, supra note 5, at 59.
211. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 783. The traditional view is that in courts-
martial defendants do not have Fifth Amendment constitutional rights because
the UCMJ does not include them. See Note, supra note 91 at 127.
212. Eisentrager was decided in 1950. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763.
213. See Note, supra note 91, at 127.
214. See id.
215. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
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sovereign territory. In making its determination of whether
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applied outside of
U.S. sovereign territory, the Supreme Court instead
concentrated on the country and the court system trying the
non-citizen.216 Specifically, the Court examined "the legal
traditions employed in the Philippines . . . , the significance of
the constitutional rights asserted, and the ability of the
existing system to accept the burdens of applying new
constitutional constraints" before coming to its holding.
2 17
The petitioners in Dorr were prosecuted in the Philippine
court system and asserted a right to a jury trial under the
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.218 Importantly,
Dorr asserted this right in a system that "already provided
numerous procedural safeguards" 219 and operated under an
"established system of jurisprudence."220 Therefore, the
burden of granting the Sixth Amendment right in this
established Philippine court system was great.221 Indeed, the
Court felt that recognizing the right to a trial by jury as a
fundamental right in the Philippine courts might "work
injustice and provoke disturbance" rather than aid in the
"orderly administration of justice" because "a large majority
of the population would be unfit to serve as jurors." 222
Ultimately, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment "right
to trial by jury was not a 'fundamental' right guaranteed
outside of the United States."223
Notably, the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and
unusual punishment in the form of the juvenile death penalty
has not been expressly addressed in the context of trials by
U.S. military commissions. 224 Also, there are no impediments
to "work injustice" by applying this right in U.S. military
commissions, which already operate under "an American
216. Id.
217. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 455 (2005)
(D.D.C. 2005) (discussing Dorr, 195 U.S. 138).
218. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 139.
219. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (citing Dorr,
195 U.S. 138).
220. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148.
221. See id.
222. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (quoting Dorr,
195 U.S. at 145-48).
223. Id.
224. See supra Part II.B.1.
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system of justice, 225 namely, the UCMJ. 226 The Court in Dorr
also looked at "the significance of the constitutional rights
asserted."227 In Dorr, the asserted right was the right to a
jury trial,228 whereas for juvenile enemy combatants tried in
U.S. military commissions, the concern is the right against
cruel and unusual punishment in the form of the juvenile
death penalty. Under any standard, the right against the
juvenile death penalty is clearly a "significant" right.
While there is no clear ruling that the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution applies to alien unlawful
juvenile enemy combatants, it appears from Roper,
Eisentrager, and Dorr that there is an argument to support
such a holding. Nevertheless, without a clear ruling to that
effect, it appears that currently, the U.S. Constitution will not
protect such individuals from the death penalty.
B. Military Law Protection Against the Juvenile Death
Penalty: The Uniform Code of Military Justice
The UCMJ and the Military Commissions Act are
available to protect juvenile enemy combatants in U.S.
military commissions.229 On the other hand, the extent to
which these doctrines protect individuals under the age of
eighteen against the death penalty in U.S. military
commissions remains unclear.
The UCMJ sets forth the basic rules and procedures to be
followed in U.S. military commissions and courts-martial,230
and the Military Commissions Act supplements and abridges
those rules for military commissions specifically.23' Under the
UCMJ and the Military Commissions Act,232 "all persons" who
225. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
226. Uniform Code of Military Justice, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (2006).
The UCMJ is a federal law enacted by Congress. See, e.g., Military Legal
Resources Legislative History,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/UCMJLHP.html (last visited May 7,
2007).
227. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (discussing
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904)).
228. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 139.
229. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); see also Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 948b(a)-(c), 948c, 1200 Stat.
2600 (2006).
230. Military Commissions Act § 948b(c).
231. Id. §§ 948b(d)(A)-(C), 950(b)-(g).
232. The Military Commissions Act uses the phrase "any person" instead of
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commit the crime of murder are subject to the death
penalty.23 3 "All persons" presumably includes children under
the age of eighteen 234 given that neither doctrine mentions
the words "juvenile" or "child," nor makes any distinctions
based on the age of an individual. 235 Therefore, based on the
express statements of both doctrines, it appears the death
penalty may be sought against juvenile enemy combatants in
U.S. military commissions.
On the other hand, both the UCMJ and the Military
Commissions Act also contain express proclamations against
cruel and unusual punishments.236 Yet, neither doctrine
offers an express definition of the term. One means of
interpreting U.S. military law would be to use definitions of
the same phase set forth in U.S. domestic law. 237 According to
U.S. law, as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roper,
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
prohibits the use of the death penalty against individuals
under the age of eighteen.238 Therefore, using this definition
of "cruel and unusual punishment" to interpret the UCMJ
and the Military Commissions Act would protect juvenile
enemy combatants from the death penalty in U.S. military
commissions.
Another complication is that U.S. military law defines a
non-citizen juvenile as a child under the age of sixteen,239
whereas U.S. domestic law defines a citizen juvenile as one
under the age of eighteen. 240 As a result, individuals ages
"all persons." Id. § 950v(b)(15).
233. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (2006); see also id. § 918, art. 118; Military
Commissions Act § 950v(b)(15).
234. Neither doctrine explicitly states this, but neither distinguishes between
children and adults.
235. Military Commissions Act § 950v(b)(15) (referring to "all persons" or
"any person" throughout); UCMJ § 918, art. 118 (same).
236. Military Commissions Act § 949s; UCMJ § 855, art. 55.
237. Note that while U.S. military commissions are operated by the U.S.
military, they do not have to follow U.S. domestic rules and procedures, or U.S.
interpretations of laws. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950).
But, as the UCMJ and the Military Commissions Act do not define "any
persons" or all things that account for "cruel and unusual punishments," this is
one of the few means available to interpret these phrases. The U.S. military
could also choose to define the phrases separate from any other body of law.
238. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005).
239. E.g., Jamison, supra note 112, at 135-36.
240. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574; Jamison, supra note 112, at 135-36; supra Part
II.D. The phrases "child," "juvenile," or even "persons below eighteen," are used
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sixteen and seventeen are more likely to be subject to the
death penalty in U.S. military commissions.241 Conversely,
while it appears that such individuals under the age of
sixteen may be protected against the juvenile death penalty,
this protection is not guaranteed.242  Whether the U.S.
military will choose to interpret U.S. military law using the
same definition as U.S. domestic law is unclear. Like the
phrase "juvenile," the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment"
could be defined differently under U.S. military law.243
Therefore, it remains unclear whether the UCMJ and the
Military Commissions Act protect any juvenile under the age
of eighteen from the death penalty in U.S. military
commissions.
C. International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
Protection Against the Juvenile Death Penalty
"Treaties made . . .under the Authority of the United
States are to be the supreme law of the Land."2 Many of
these treaties, comprising both international human rights
and international humanitarian law, are applicable to theWar on Terror. 245  While both bodies of law permit
derogations from treaty obligations during times of
emergency, there are core rights that cannot be eliminated.
2 46
The relevant issue here is whether these core international
law rights will protect alien unlawful juvenile enemy
combatants from the death penalty in U.S. military
commissions .247
interchangeably, but appear to mean the same thing.
241. The U.S. military could follow all U.S. domestic prohibitions against
executing juveniles and still execute sixteen and seventeen year-olds according
to their definition of "juvenile."
242. The U.S. military could not follow U.S. domestic laws that prohibit the
execution of juveniles by executing individuals under the age of sixteen. Even
according to their own definition of "juvenile," this practice would be precluded.
243. See The Threat of a Bad Example - Undermining International
Standards as "War on Terror" Detentions Continue, supra note 163; Jamison,
supra note 112, at 135-36.
244. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 125 S. Ct.
2749 (2006) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, §1, cl. 2). Thus, the treaties to which
the United States is a party should have the force and effect of U.S. legislation.
16 AM. ,JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 55 (2007).
245. See supra Part II.B.3.
246. See Brooks, supra note 113, at 711-14.
247. Note that while the protection under either body of law may be clear,
the enforcement of those obligations in military commissions is not. A
856 [Vol: 47
20071 JUVENILE ENEMY COMBATANTS 857
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 248 sets
forth the general rules that a state must follow in its treaty
obligations.249 First, a state is obligated to carry out the
conventions and treaties to which they are a party.250 This
obligation is generally not imposed by penalty.251 Alternately,
a state is obligated to not frustrate the purpose of those
treaties to which they are not a party, but only a signatory.252
Second, treaty obligations may not be supplanted by contrary
domestic laws. 25 3 A state is expected to make reservations to
a treaty in so far as a treaty obligation is contrary to the
state's domestic law.254  A reservation cannot be made,
however, if it is incompatible with the object and purpose of
the treaty.255
The rights of juveniles are protected in the Geneva
Convention,256 the CRC,257 the Optional Protocol to the
fundamental concern for juvenile enemy combatants is whether they will be
allowed to invoke international law as a means of protection once they have
gained access to a court. The United States has asserted that treaty obligations
are not privately enforceable or self-executing, meaning that in private actions
individuals cannot enforce treaty obligations unless Congress enacts
authorizing legislation. See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 327 (D.D.C.
2005); see also 74 AM. JUR. 2D Treaties § 3 (2007) (comparing self-executing and
executory treaties).
248. Vienna Convention, supra note 111.
249. See id. at pmbl., arts. 1, 3, 4.
250. Id. at arts. 2(1)(b), (g) (indicating that if a state ratifies/accepts/approves
a treaty, it is considered to be a party, and must follow all of the treaty rules
and obligations).
251. Most treaty obligations are not self-executing. If a treaty were self-
executing, its obligations could be enforced in U.S. domestic courts, and
penalties could be imposed for non-compliance. See id. at art. 26; 74 AM. JUR.
2D Treaties §§ 3, 34 (2007).
252. Vienna Convention, supra note 111, at arts. 18(a)-(b) (stating that, by
becoming a signatory to a treaty, a state is: (1) either showing its general
approval of the treaty that is awaiting entry into force; or (2) theoretically in the
pre-stages of joining the treaty as a party (note that a state may stay in this
stage indefinitely and never join as a party)).
253. Id. at art. 27 (stating that if a state becomes a party to a treaty, that
state must perform the treaty obligations even if they are in conflict with the
state's domestic laws).
254. Id. at arts. 2(1)(d), 19 (stating that a reservation is essentially an
exception to a state's acceptance of a treaty obligation; declaring that the state
fully accepts the treaty obligations with the exception of the section to which it
made the reservation).
255. Id. at art. 19(c) (meaning that a state cannot make a reservation that
goes to the heart of the treaty).
256. Geneva Convention, supra note 37. The United States ratified this
treaty on August 2, 1955. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 113.
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CRC,2 58 and in the ICCPR. 5 9 Each of these treaties protects
against the juvenile death penalty or against cruel and
unusual punishment.26 °  Whether these rights will be
extended to alien unlawful juvenile enemy combatants in U.S.
military commissions depends on the United States' relation
to each treaty, and the interaction between the treaty
obligations and U.S. law and policy.
The Geneva Convention distinguishes between
international armed conflicts 26' and internal armed conflicts
in order to determine the applicable rights.262 Yet, in reality,
few modern wars fit into either category,2 3  leaving
combatants without the protection of the majority of the
Geneva Convention.2" The War on Terror is one such
example.265 Perhaps recognizing this breakdown of Geneva
Convention definitions, the Supreme Court recently held that
individuals tried by military commissions are protected by, at
the least, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.266
While Common Article 3 offers very minimal protection, it
does protect against "cruel treatment."267  According to U.S.
case law, the juvenile death penalty for individuals under
eighteen constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" under
the U.S. Constitution. 68  Despite similar wording, the
definition of this phrase under U.S. law and international law
may be interpreted differently.269
257. CRC, supra note 114.
258. Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note 115.
259. ICCPR, supra note 116.
260. CRC, supra note 114, at arts. 6.1, 37; Geneva Convention, supra note 37,
at art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 116, at art. 6(5).
261. The current war on terror is not an international armed conflict. See
Brooks, supra note 113, at 711-14.
262. The War on Terror is also not an internal armed conflict. See id. at 711-
15.
263. Id. at 713-14.
264. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention extends to all combatants.
See, e.g., id. at 712.
265. Id. at 711-14.
266. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006). Common Article 3
extends to all combatants, regardless of title. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 113,
at 712; supra Part II.B.3 (providing background information on Common Article
3).
267. Geneva Convention, supra note 37, at art. 3.
268. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
269. The phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" can be and often is
interpreted differently depending on the document in which it is located. In the
U.S. Constitution, punishment is "cruel and unusual" if it offends the "evolving
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The CRC expressly forbids the imposition of the juvenile
death penalty. ° Importantly, the United States chose to join
only as a signatory to this treaty, while all other states in the
world except for Somalia have ratified it.2 7 1 Nevertheless, as
a state signatory, the United States still has a clear duty to
not frustrate the purpose of the treaty.272 Article 1 of the CRC
states that "[1]or the purposes of the present Convention, a
child means every human being below the age of eighteen."273
To treat an individual under the age of eighteen as an adult
may frustrate the purpose of this obligation. 4  In addition,
Article 6.1 states that "[p]arties [must] recognize that every
child has an inherent right to life."275 The duty under Article
37 is similar but more explicit: "No child shall be subjected to
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."276 This includes imposing "capital punishment"
on "persons below eighteen years of age."277
The United States is a party to the Optional Protocol to
the CRC .27  As a party to this treaty, the United States has
the duty to carry out all sections of the treaty, even where
contrary to its own law. 9 Yet, the Optional Protocol to the
CRC, along with the CRC, deals almost exclusively with the
recruitment of child soldiers, 20  and therefore, is only
marginally helpful as a defense for alien unlawful juvenile
enemy combatants. 21  At the least, the Optional Protocol to
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." See Roper,
543 U.S. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)). This
standard is not used to interpret the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of
the English Declaration of Independence of 1689. See id. at 577-78.
270. CRC, supra note 114, at arts. 6.1, 37.
271. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 113.
272. Vienna Convention, supra note 111, at art. 18. The U.S. military may
do this by defining "juvenile" differently under U.S. military law than under
U.S. law. See supra Part II.D.
273. CRC, supra note 114, at art. 1.
274. See supra Part II.D.
275. CRC, supra note 114, at art. 6.1.
276. Id. at art. 37.
277. Id.
278. The United States ratified the Optional Protocol to the CRC on January
23, 2003. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 113.
279. Vienna Convention, supra note 111, at art. 27.
280. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 25
May 2000, Introduction, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/595?OpenDocument
(last visited May 7, 2007).
281. Because these treaties are aimed at the recruitment of child soldiers,
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the CRC stands for the proposition "that the rights of children
require special protection."282  In addition, the treaty is
important in that it clearly states that "a child means every
human being below the age of [eighteen] years."28 3 As a party
to this treaty, the United States has an obligation to
recognize that alien unlawful juvenile enemy combatants are
individuals under the age of eighteen. 284  The practice of
distinguishing alien juveniles tried by military commissions,
and holding them to a different standard28 5 may run contrary
to the United States' obligation under this treaty.
The ICCPR also expressly prohibits the juvenile death
penalty for individuals under the age of eighteen.286 The
United States is a party to the ICCPR, 217 but in 1992, made
an express reservation to the clause which prohibits the
juvenile death penalty.288 Nevertheless, it is possible that the
Roper decision in 2005 effectively withdrew this reservation.
In the 1992 Reservation to the ICCPR, the Senate stated
that "[tihe United States reserves the right, subject to its
Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on
any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted
under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of
capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age."289 The
clause "subject to its Constitutional constraints" seems to
imply that this reservation is subject to the United States'
current interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. In 2005, the
Roper decision changed the United States' interpretation of
they do not focus on the detainment and punishment of child soldiers, which is
the focus of comment. See supra notes 114, 115.
282. Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note 115, at pmbl.
283. Id.
284. Note that, since the United States is a signatory to the Optional Protocol
to the CRC, this is an "obligation" to carry out the treaty, not merely a "duty not
to frustrate" the treaty. See supra notes 250, 252, 253 and accompanying text
(defining "party" and "signatory").
285. See supra Part II.D.
286. ICCPR, supra note 116, at art. 6(5).
287. The United States ratified the ICCRP on September 8, 1992. See
UNHCHR, supra note 116.
288. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. REP. 102-2331
(2d Sess. 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992) [hereinafter Report on the
ICCPR] (setting forth Senate's reservations regarding ICCPR).
289. Id. at 653.
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the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution to preclude the
juvenile death penalty.29 ° Therefore, it is possible that the
U.S. military's interpretation has also changed to mirror that
of U.S. law.
Second, in the Reservation to the ICCPR, the Senate
explicitly noted that the "execution of people for crimes
committed while they were under the age of [sixteen] has
been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."291 It is
significant that the Senate, in making this reservation to
international law, referenced then-current U.S. domestic law
on the juvenile death penalty,292 and made the reservation
parallel to this U.S. domestic law.293 Currently, the 1992
reservation does not parallel the new law, set forth in 2005 by
Roper, that individuals under the age of eighteen may not be
subjected to the death penalty.294 It is not clear whether the
United States intends for its international obligations
regarding the juvenile death penalty to parallel its current
domestic policy.295 If it does, the United States may choose to
withdraw the Reservation to the ICCPR.296 If the United
States then upholds its obligations under the ICCPR, free
from the reservation, it would no longer be allowed to execute
alien unlawful juvenile enemy combatants under the age of
eighteen.297
If the Reservation to the ICCPR is still in effect, there is
290. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), abrogating Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
291. Report on the ICCPR, supra note 288, at 651.
292. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380, overruled by Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (holding
that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishment" precluded the death penalty for individuals under the age of
sixteen).
293. Report on the ICCPR, supra note 288, at 651 (stating that the United
States made the reservation to the ICCPR "on executing people for crimes
committed while they were 16 or 17").
294. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
295. The fact that Congress has not addressed this difference between the
1992 reservation and current U.S. domestic law does not mean that the United
States intends to overturn the 1992 reservation. Congress may be aware of the
contrasting positions, and intend maintain the status quo. Nonetheless, there
is an important tension between the contrasting statements made in the 1992
reservation and the rule articulated in Roper v. Simmons.
296. Vienna Convention, supra note 111, at pt. II, § 2, art. 22(1) ("[A]
reservation may be withdrawn at any time.").
297. There would most likely still be a problem with the admissibility of the
ICCPR obligation in military commissions. See supra note 247.
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yet another consideration. The Vienna Convention 298
explicitly states that reservations cannot be "incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty." 99 It is possible
that the reservation clarifying that the United States does not
accept the prohibition on executing people for crimes
committed while they were sixteen or seventeen years of age
frustrates the object and purpose of the ICCPR. Clearly, the
ban on the juvenile death penalty is a major component of the
ICCPR °° In addition, international law clearly states that a
juvenile is an individual under the age of eighteen.3°' Thus, a
strong argument can also be made that the Reservation to the
ICCPR, which allows for the juvenile death penalty,
frustrates the purpose of the ICCPR, and therefore, was
invalid at its implementation. 2
V. PROPOSAL: CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW TO ABROGATE THE
JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILE ENEMY
COMBATANTS
Juveniles, regardless of their country of citizenship,
possess similar mental capacities and developmental levels. 3
This similarity was the motivation behind the Supreme
Court's categorical rule against the juvenile death penalty in
the 2005 Roper decision. 4 However, the United States
appears to harbor the intention of treating non-citizen
juveniles as if they are somehow different than their own.0
If this distinction is allowed, U.S. military law conflicts with
U.S. domestic law.30 6 While there are many ways to resolve
298. Vienna Convention, supra note 111.
299. Id. at pt. II, § 2, art. 19(c).
300. The goal of the ICCPR was to protect the basic human rights and
freedoms of all individuals. See ICCPR, supra note 116, at pmbl. Protection
against the death penalty is a very important human right.
301. CRC, supra note 114, at art. 1; Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note
115, at pmbl.
302. See Vienna Convention, supra note 111, at arts. 18, 19(c); Amnesty Int'l,
The Exclusion of Child Offenders from the Death Penalty under General
International Law (July 18, 2003),
httpJ/web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact500042003 (discussing eleven
countries and the Human Rights Committee that made this argument).
303. See Jamison, supra note 112, at 153-55.
304. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), abrogating Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
305. See Detention Order, supra note 8, § 4(a).
306. While it is true that the U.S. judicial system is separate from the U.S.
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this conflict, two proposals appear to be the strongest.
The first proposal would be to add an assertion in the
Detention Order, the DTA, or the Military Commissions Act,
that "individuals under the age of eighteen are not subject to
the death penalty." This has the advantage for the United
States of keeping the bag of constitutional rights sealed from
non-citizens, while removing the juvenile death penalty as a
possible punishment. Such a clear-cut proposition is also
advantageous because there is no room for interpretation in
the statement "no death penalty for individuals under
eighteen," and therefore, no room to circumvent the obligation
to protect juveniles.
The second proposal is to withdraw the United States'
1992 reservation to the ICCPR °7 While the reservation has
already come into question with the 2005 Roper decision, 0 in
order for the United States to fortify its position, a formal
withdrawal would be advantageous. This proposal has the
disadvantage that it may advance further than the United
States is currently willing to. The United States may instead
prefer to leave the issue of the juvenile death penalty open to
discretion. Yet as evidenced by the definitions of the laws of
war in the Geneva Convention, °9 precise definitions are far
superior, and even necessary, to avoiding future conflicts and
derogation of rights. This proposal also has the disadvantage
that the right against the death penalty granted to juveniles
by international law may not be directly enforceable in
private actions. 10 In the end, however, withdrawing the
reservation would constitute a strong statement by the
United States on the juvenile death penalty by aligning its
practices with the majority of the world.311 For that reason,
such action would be the strongest method for ending the
current dilemma.
military system, both operate under the rules and procedures enacted by the
U.S. government. Conflicts between the two systems are inherent, but for
issues as weighty as the juvenile death penalty, such a disparity is more
serious.
307. See supra Part IV.C.
308. See supra Part V.A.
309. See Brooks, supra note 113, at 677-87.
310. See supra note 247.
311. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576-77 (2005).
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VI. CONCLUSION
With between 60 and 107 juvenile terror suspects
currently being detained in U.S. military prisons,312 the issue
of whether the juvenile death penalty will be imposed on such
individuals in U.S. military commissions is likely to emerge.
Currently, it does not appear that such individuals will have
U.S. constitutional law protections,313 which, under Roper,
clearly protects against imposition of the juvenile death
penalty for all individuals under the age of eighteen.314
Nevertheless, using the definition of "cruel and unusual
punishment" articulated in Roper1 5 would protect juvenile
enemy combatants from the death penalty in U.S. military
commissions.316
Second, military law does not appear to protect alien
unlawful juvenile enemy combatants from the death penalty.
The UCMJ makes no distinction between adults and children
in its authorization of the death penalty.3 7 However, an
assertion added to the Detention Order, the DTA, or the
Military Commissions Act,318 that "individuals under the age
of eighteen are not subject to the death penalty" would
unambiguously preclude the juvenile death penalty in U.S.
military commissions.
Finally, international human rights and international
humanitarian law, like U.S. domestic law, clearly protect all
individuals under the age of eighteen from the death
penalty. 9 In spite of this clarity, the United States has been
careful to avoid joining as a party any treaty that expressly
forbids the imposition of the juvenile death penalty without
making a reservation. The fact that the United States made
an express reservation to the ICCPR's prohibition against the
juvenile death penalty3 20 demonstrates that as of 1992, the
United States wanted this punishment to remain available
312. Mackay, supra note 4, at 1.
313. See supra Part V.A.
314. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
315. Id.; see also supra Part IV.A.
316. The question remains whether the U.S. military would use U.S.
domestic law to interpret military law. See supra note 237.
317. UCMJ, supra note 25, § 855, at art. 55.
318. These pieces of legislation act together with the UCMJ to set forth the
law in U.S. military commissions.
319. See supra Part IV.C.
320. Report on the ICCPR, supra note 288.
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for non-citizens. Nonetheless, a withdrawal of the United
States' 1992 reservation to the ICCPR321 would preclude the
future imposition of the juvenile death penalty in U.S.
military commissions.22
In the end, it is possible that the weight of international
practice and opinion may tip in favor of abolishing the death
penalty for alien unlawful juvenile enemy combatants.323
There is no question that in authorizing the juvenile death
penalty for U.S. military commissions, the United States
stands in stark contrast to the world community.324
321. See supra Part IV.C.
322. See supra Part IV.C.
323. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604-06 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
324. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 577 (majority opinion) ("[Tihe United States now
stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death
penalty.").
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